Cambridge University Press, 2003. — 331 p.
Patrick Morgan’s authoritative study revisits the place of deterrence after the Cold War. By assessing and questioning the state of modern deterrence theory, particularly under conditions of nuclear proliferation, Morgan argues that there are basic flaws in the design of the theory that ultimately limit its utility. Given the probable patterns of future international politics, he suggests that greater attention be paid to general deterrence as opposed to immediate deterrence and to examining the deterrent capabilities of collective actors such as NATO and theUNSecurity Council. Finally, he contends that the revolution in military affairs can promote less reliance on deterrence by retaliatory
threats, support better collective management of peace and security and permit us to outgrow nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This new major work builds upon Patrick Morgan’s landmark book, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (1983).
History: deterrence in the Cold War.
Deterrence and rationality.
General deterrence.
Testing, testing, one...two...three.
Collective actor deterrence.
The revolution in military affairs and deterrence.
Deterrence in the post-ColdWar world.
Some conclusions.